Category: Flu Virus

SIOUX COUNTY, Iowa (KGAN) Another case of the highly contagious H5N1 avian flu, also known as the bird flu, has been detected in a herd of dairy cattle in Sioux County.

The virus affects both wild and domestic birds primarily, but has begun spreading in other animals, most notable cattle. Fortunately, cows are better able to fight the virus and ultimately recover. Experts say the nation's milk supply is in no real danger right now, as the common practice of pasteurizing store-bought milk eliminates the virus.

But last year, Iowa legalized the sale of unpasteurized milk, also known as raw milk. The FDA is warning everyone to avoid drinking raw milk, as it is unclear just how widespread the virus is. In Iowa, leaders are focusing testing efforts in areas where the flu has already been detected.

Human cases of the bird flu are rare but can be deadly. This year, a number of cases have been reported but all were from direct and prolonged contact with infected cattle.

Six cattle herds in Iowa have now been found to have infected cows, all in western Iowa. The latest case is the 4th in Sioux County. O'Brien and Plymouth Counties have each seen one case.

Continued here:

More avian flu detected in western Iowa as testing continues - KMPH Fox 26

Late last week the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) published a study showing that the current strain of H5N1 (A/Texas/37/2024) avian flu was fatal in six ferrets used as part of an experimental infection study. The findings caused waves across the country, as ferrets are frequently used as an animal model stand-in for people.

But Michael T. Osterholm, PhD, MPH, who directs the University of Minnesota's Center for Infectious Disease Research and Policy (CIDRAP), publisher of CIDRAP News, was not surprised by the findings.

Osterholm said H5 viruses like H5N1 have historically been fatal to ferrets, and, moreover, the ferrets used in the study were immune-naive animals with no previous exposure to any influenza viruses.

"Previous H5 isolates have also been put into the ferret model and found similar results," said Osterholm. "I would have been surprised had it not done that [killed the ferrets.] This doesnt minimize what is happening with H5, but there is no evidence to date that would support serious illness in humans."

Osterholm said researchers are still trying to understand the wider implications of the H5 cases.

In the CDC study, the authors noted that the H5N1 virus, which was taken from the human case-patient in Texas, spread efficiently between ferrets only through direct contact but not via respiratory droplets.

"This is different from what is seen with seasonal flu, which infects 100% of ferrets via respiratory droplets," the CDC said. "These findings are not surprising and do not change CDC's risk assessment for most people, which is low."

These findings are not surprising and do not change CDC's risk assessment for most people, which is low.

The CDC said the results do reinforce the need for people who work with infected animals to take precautions.

In related news, a study out of Poland described the first documented cases of natural H5N1 cases in five pet ferrets, which occurred at the same time the country saw an uptick of H5 cases in cats in 2023.

The three juvenile pet ferret became sick, and one of them died, but all tested positive for the virus, including the adult animals, which exhibited no or minimal symptoms.

"This outbreak suggests the possibility of asymptomatic A/H5N1 virus shedding by ferrets, highlighting their zoonotic potential and the advisability of excluding fresh or frozen poultry from their diet to reduce the A/H5N1 virus transmission risks," the authors wrote.

Officials in Wyoming have confirmed that a dairy herd in that state is now infected with avian flu, the 12th affected state in the country.

The detection was first identified in samples received by the Wyoming State Veterinary Laboratory and was confirmed by the US Department of Agriculture (USDA).

"The Wyoming Livestock Board encourages all dairy producers to closely monitor their herd and contact their herd veterinarian immediately if their cattle appear symptomatic, said State Veterinarian Hallie Hasel, DVM. "The primary concern with this diagnosis is on-dairy production losses, as the disease has been associated with decreased milk production. The risk to cattle is minimal and the risk to human health remains very low."

In Iowa, which confirmed high-path avian flu in dairy cattle last week, officials from the Iowa Department of Agriculture and Land Stewardship are requesting resources from the USDA and announcing additional response measures, including providing compensation for culled dairy cattle at a fair market value and compensation for lost milk production at a minimum of 90% of fair market value.

In global developments:

See the original post:

Study shows 'not surprising' fatal spread of avian flu in ferrets - University of Minnesota Twin Cities

Shared equipment and shared personnel working on multiple dairy farms are some of the main risk factors for ongoing spread of highly pathogenic H5N1 avian flu in dairy cows, the US Department of Agriculture (USDA) Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) said today in a pair of new epidemiologic reports.

One of the reports is an overview based on the results of questionnaires from affected dairy herds, and the other is a deep dive into the dairy cow and poultry outbreaks in Michigan, the state hit hardest by outbreaks in dairy cows, which now number at least 94.

At a media briefing today, Kammy Johnson, DVM, PhD, a veterinary epidemiologist with APHIS, said the multistate epi report provides a national clinical picture of the disease in cows and the routes of spread, and the report from Michigan is an early snapshot showing what's happening in the field.

Both suggest three key factors for transmission between farms: shared equipment and vehicles, shared personnel who may inadvertently carry the virus between farms on their clothes or boots, and animal movements. "The bigger picture is that enhanced biosecurity is really critical," she said.

So far, genomic evidence continues to suggest a single introduction from wild birds, with further spread among dairy farms, such as from Texas to Michigan in the initial weeks of the outbreak. Now the virus is spreading between farms owing to multiple direct and indirect factors, according to the APHIS reports.

Questionnaires revealed that more than 20% of farms received cattle within 30 days of clinical signs, and 60% of farms continued to move cattle off the facilities after animals showed signs of illness.

Most farms had cats present, and more than 50% of those had sick or dead cats. Also, more than 20% of dairy farms also had chickens or poultry, nearly all of which had sick or dead birds. USDA officials said cats are the canary in the coalmine, but cats and other animals, such as wild birds, probably aren't playing a major role in the spread of the virus, though they could serve as fomites.

Clinically, lactating cows are the most affected, with signs of illness in less than 10% of herds and mortality and culling averaging less than 2%.

Meanwhile, the report from Michigan is based on data gathered by an APHIS strike team that the Michigan Department of Agriculture and Rural Development invited into the state to probe links between infected dairy farms and spillovers into poultry premises. It includes findings from 15 dairy farms and 8 poultry producers.

About 20% of dairy workers, and some of their family members, worked on multiple dairy farms. About 7% of workers on affected dairy farms also worked on poultry farms. Regarding equipment, about 62% of farms shared vehicles to transport cattle, and only 12% cleaned the vehicles before use.

The farms also had frequent visitors, such as veterinarians, feed consultants, and contract haulers. Nearly all of the affected farms are part of the same dairy co-op, and the diaries all used the same deadstock hauler.

So far, the B3.13 outbreak strain has not been found in Michigan's migratory waterfowl.

The authors of the report praised the willingness of Michigan's dairy producers to participate in the investigation, emphasizing that the findings have greatly increased the body of knowledge about B3.13, both in Michigan and nationally. "This report could not have been completed without them."

At today's briefing, Johnson said it's too early to assess how H5N1 spread to the three more recently affected states: Iowa, Minnesota, and Wyoming. She added that today's report paints a national picture of what's known about the outbreaks so far and adds some useful context to understanding the events.

She said the findings are a solemn reminder that farms already have tools for managing the spread of the virus. "Biosecurity is the key to prevention."

Mark Lyons, DVM, who directs the Veterinary Services Ruminant Health Center at APHIS, said it's still not clear if the outbreaks are still gaining steam and that animal health officials are still trying to understand the full scope of the situation, though they expect to find additional cases.

As of yesterday, the APHIS total was at 94 dairy farm outbreaks in 12 states. Yesterday, the Iowa Department of Agriculture and Land Stewardship reported the state's third outbreak in a dairy herd, which affected a second location in Sioux County.

Responding to questions about Michigan's second case-patient in a dairy worker, who, unlike the other previous patients, had respiratory symptoms, Nirav Shah, JD, MD, principal deputy director for the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), said the polymerase chain reaction cycle threshold (Ct) value for the patient's sample was high, suggesting a lower amount of viral RNA in the sample.

The situation made it difficult for CDC scientists to generate a full genomic sequence, though they were able to piece together a large portion of it, he said.

So far, the findings are reassuring, with no changes to suggest that the virus that infected the patient has a higher ability to transmit and no changes in the neuraminidase that would suggest reduced sensitivity to H5 vaccines or existing therapies, Shah said.

Regarding vaccines, David Boucher, PhD, director of infectious disease preparedness and response at the Department of Health and Human Services Administration for Strategic Preparedness, said federal health officials are still on track to produce 4.8 million vaccine doses from bulk antigen on a 3- to 4-month timeline, with manufacturing starting in the middle of July.

In other H5N1 developments:

Original post:

USDA reports reveal biosecurity risks at H5N1-affected dairy farms - University of Minnesota Twin Cities

Bird flu poses a massive threat, and the potential for a catastrophic new pandemic is imminent. We still have a chance to stop a possible humanitarian disaster, but only if we get to work urgently, carefully and aggressively.

This will require a major collective shift in the way we approach infectious diseases management one that embraces a One Health approach and prioritizes prevention of human infection before widespread infection happens, rather than responding rapidly once human cases become widespread.

As Canada Research Chair in Viral Pandemics and director of the M.G. DeGroote Institute for Infectious Disease Research at McMaster University, I have spent my career studying the impact of previous pandemics, and developing new ways to prevent them in the future. The actions taken now will determine whether the highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) H5N1 outbreak already affecting birds and mammals around the world takes hold in humans.

Weve been watching the global spread of this new strain of H5N1 for roughly five years, from the time it first appeared in wild birds and literally flew around the world. We have seen it adapt and move into domestic poultry flocks, causing millions of chickens, turkeys and ducks to be destroyed to keep the virus at bay.

Read more: Bird flu in cattle: What are the concerns surrounding the newly emerging bovine H5N1 influenza virus?

International concern about the potential of this virus to cause a pandemic increased significantly in 2022, when the HPAI H5N1 was confirmed to have adapted and jumped to mammals like foxes, skunks, ferrets and seals. These animals are more closely related to humans than birds, giving the virus a chance to learn how to infect us more efficiently. Now its picking up speed.

By March, H5N1 had infected dairy cattle in Texas. By the time the situation could be assessed, testing showed 20 per cent of the milk supply there had been touched by H5N1 (while remaining safe for consumption thanks to pasteurization), and infected cows could be found in almost every corner of the country.

In recent weeks, reports have identified H5N1 infection in three dairy-farm workers in the United States, two with conjunctivitis (pink eye) and, most recently, one with respiratory symptoms. Sadly, someone in Mexico also recently died from a closely related H5N2 influenza virus infection. There are almost certainly many more cases than these.

Dairy farms are at risk of becoming dangerous incubators for the virus because mechanized milking seems likely to be responsible for spread among cattle, and facility cleaning procedures often generate airborne droplets that pose a serious risk of human infection.

We have yet to see human-to-human transmission of this H5N1 virus, but the virus is always adapting to new hosts, and the early animal-to-human infections we have seen are giving the virus opportunities to learn how to thrive in the human body.

Previous outbreaks of avian influenza have killed more than 50 per cent of the people they infected. These numbers are more consistent with viruses such as Ebola, rather than with seasonal influenza or even COVID-19. The potential for high human mortality is what makes this influenza such an urgent concern. There are ways to halt the march of H5N1, but whether they will be put to use is still an open question.

Many of the viruses that have caused recent unexpected outbreaks, like Zika, would have been very difficult to prevent. Influenza viruses, however, are an all-too familiar pandemic risk, having already caused four pandemics between 1918 and 2009.

Given what we just experienced with COVID-19, letting bird flu take hold in humans would represent a spectacular failure to learn our lesson.

People may wonder why it matters that we prevent a pandemic when we can limit spread and mitigate illness with masks, drugs and vaccines. It will not be that simple. When COVID-19 first emerged, we had no vaccines available for coronaviruses, and so the development of safe and effective COVID-19 vaccines was a steep challenge.

With H5N1, well be able to apply the same fundamental technologies we use to produce seasonal influenza vaccines by adapting the formulation to whatever form the virus may take in humans. But that cant happen instantly, and by the time bird flu has hit humanity, it may already be too late. Vaccines take time to produce, especially on a global scale, which would demand more than eight billion doses.

During the 2009 H1N1 swine flu outbreak, the pandemic had already passed its peak by the time a vaccine was getting out to the public despite the considerable global infrastructure already in place to produce influenza vaccines.

The people most likely to suffer are people in remote and Indigenous communities, the poor, the frail and elderly, medically vulnerable individuals, the very young and the displaced.

Strategies are beginning to develop in many places around the world to prevent the virus from jumping into the human population, including infection-control measures to protect farm animals from exposure and using personal protective equipment for farm workers.

Those whose jobs put them at high risk of exposure to H5N1 may need to be offered vaccines and medications that can prevent exposures from blossoming into full-blown infections, in much the same way we selectively provide rabies vaccines to those whose work puts them in close contact with wild animals.

Though plans are taking shape, such measures can only be effective if people are willing to use them. We know how much resistance there was to masking and vaccines during the COVID-19 pandemic

Pushing back the bird flu will need public buy-in and public resources. Prevention approaches must be sensitive to those most impacted. Farmers, hunters and others who are regularly exposed to potentially infected animals will need good information and education to understand why they must act. Approaches should be evidence-based and offer people options whenever possible. Mandates should be viewed as a last resort.

People whose livelihoods may be jeopardized by the cost of biosecurity measures will need resources to support them in taking actions that could potentially save millions of lives. All this demands new government policies, and enhanced co-operation and co-ordination between agencies responsible for farm animal, human and wildlife health.

Canada has been taking encouraging steps in this direction, but alone cannot stop a bird flu pandemic. However, this is a unique opportunity to demonstrate international leadership in effective pandemic prevention approaches.

In the United States, its critical that infections in farm workers are not concealed due to fears related to immigration status or financial strain because of lack of health insurance. Another huge risk in the wake of COVID-19 is the politicization of issues related to infection prevention, where public opposition, anti-science rhetoric and misinformation could be as deadly as a major war. Our approach and messaging needs to be empathetic and sensitive to these realities to avoid further polarization.

In national security, terrorist attacks are considered failures of intelligence. After the tragic losses of 9/11, governments made massive investments to improve security in airports and cities. These measures fundamentally changed travel and public events, and yet today we think little of yielding to rigorous measures that keep us safe from terrorism.

Preventing pandemics requires a similar mindset, starting with avian flu, where many millions are at risk. We must change our focus from response to prevention.

As with national security, the need for an outbreak response must be regarded as a failure to prevent. This is an hour of opportunity. We dont know how much or how little time we have, but the window to act is very small and the stakes are enormous.

Continued here:

An ounce of prevention: Now is the time to take action on H5N1 avian flu, because the stakes are enormous - The Conversation Indonesia

In its latest updates, the US Department of Agriculture (USDA) Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) reported 36 more H5N1 avian flu detections in house mice, all in the same New Mexico county, as well as four more virus detections in domestic cats.

On June 4, APHIS first reported H5N1 detections in house mice from New Mexico's Roosevelt County, and today it reported 36 more from the same location, raising the total to 47. Collection dates for the latest detections range from May 6 to May 12.

In a notification from the World Organization for Animal Health (WOAH) on the earlier 11 detections in house mice and a red fox from Roosevelt County, New Mexico, officials said the animals were collected from a location where highly pathogenic avian flu had been detected in poultry.

Also today, APHIS reported four more H5N1 detections in domestic cats, including one from Oklahoma, which hasn't recently reported the virus in poultry or in dairy cows.

The detection in Oklahoma occurred in Harmon County, located in the southwestern part of the state on the border with Texas. The cat is Oklahoma's first detection in a mammal. The sample was collected on March 20, and the virus is a reassortant between the global 2.3.4.4b H5N1 clade and a North American wild bird lineage.

The three other H5N1 detections in domestic catssampled in late May were in Michigan's Clinton County, where H5N1 had been found in dairy herds, and in Idaho's Jerome County, where H5N1 has been detected in poultry, alpacas, and dairy herds. The fourth new detection was from a cat from Colorado's Morgan County.

So far, the virus has been reported in 21 domestic cats.

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USDA reports more H5N1 detections in mice and cats - University of Minnesota Twin Cities

The U.S. Department of Agriculture released two reports Thursday that lay out what has been learned about how H5N1 bird flu is moving among dairy cow herds in the United States.

The reports do not shed much new light on the situation. Instead, they sum up what is known: that the outbreak was probably the result of a single spillover of the virus from wild birds into a dairy herd, likely late last year, and that movement of cows, farmworkers, and shared equipment appears to be responsible for the spread.

But the reports contain some numbers that suggest it will be challenging for the dairy industry to be able to halt the spread of H5N1 in cows.

One of the new reports was based on a voluntary survey of affected herds conducted by the USDA; the report said about 54% of affected farms took part. The second was an in-depth look at the outbreak in Michigan, which has had the most success in getting farms to agree to undergo testing of their animals. It was conducted when Michigan had reported H5N1 in 15 dairy herds and eight poultry flocks. It has since confirmed another 10 infected herds.

Here are some of the numbers from the two reports that caught our attention:

60: The first USDA report indicated that 60% of farms that completed its survey acknowledged moving animals off the farm after some of their cows started showing clinical signs of illness. The USDA requires testing of a portion of animals being moved across state lines, but no such rule exists for intra-state movement.

9: Nine of 15 affected farms in Michigan were closed herds, which meant they didnt bring in cattle from other locations. That means the introduction of infected animals from elsewhere cannot explain how the virus ended up in those herds.

100: Virtually all of the farms in Michigan reported having outside individuals come to their farms, most of whom had contact with the animals. They were specifically referencing veterinarians, cattle nutrition and feed consultants, hoof trimmers, and the like. For the national survey, that number was greater than 60%.

50: Half of farms acknowledged using trucks and trailers to move livestock within a month of noticing affected cattle on their premises. Half of the shared vehicles were not cleaned between cattle shipments.

30: More than 30% of employees at affected dairies also work at another farm with livestock, most of which had dairy cattle.

11: Of the 96 affected herds, the USDA said Thursday that operators of only 11 have applied for funds the department has made available to help farmers cover the costs of increased testing, improved biosecurity, and other containment measures.

?: During a briefing Thursday for journalists about the reports, STAT asked the USDA twice how many farms that have had positive cattle are still dealing with the virus. After all, some of the affected herds tested positive in late March. Mark Lyons, who is USDAs national incident coordinator for the H5N1 response, did not come up with an answer, saying only that 94 herds are the ones weve detected since the start of this outbreak.

Shortly after the briefing, USDA updated its list of affected herds, which now stands at 96 in 12 states.

Here is the original post:

In dribs and drabs, USDA reports suggest containing bird flu outbreak in dairy cows will be challenging - STAT

A dairy worker in Texas contracts H5N1 bird flu after contact with infected cows, and suffers eye inflammation. Weeks later, a dairy worker in Michigan begins to cough and then tests positive for the virus. A ferret in a cage (ferrets are often used as study proxies for humans) becomes infected with the virus by airborne transmission from a sick ferret in a nearby cage. These data and other recent cases of H5N1 suggest that the virus might be evolving to spread more easily to and among people.

One implication is that while U.S. health authorities say the risk to the general public remains low, that risk could increase quickly. Another implication, less obvious but worth pondering, is that our collective appetite for on-demand inexpensive meat and dairy is leading us toward another catastrophic pandemic, not just pink eye and coughing in a few people.

It is fair to criticize government bodies, such as the U.S. Department of Agriculture, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, and state departments of health and of agriculture, for their laxity, tardiness, lack of transparency and inefficacy in dealing with the dangers of H5N1 on dairy farms. For instance, why isnt blood testing for signs of the virus among dairy workers now mandatory in all U.S. dairy operations? Why isnt there widespread use of protective equipment? Why havent there been earlier and broader requirements for the testing of cows?

But we should reserve some of the blame for ourselves. Americans are eager customers of the products that industrial-scale animal husbandry provides: milk, eggs, beef, chicken and pork. They arrive on our supermarket shelves wrapped in plastic or in cardboard cartons from vast factory farms perfectly suited to serve as petri dishes for the evolution of novel pathogens novel to humans, anyway. We have surrounded ourselves with chattel animals, raised and milked and fattened and slaughtered and plucked and butchered in staggering numbers. Its no surprise that sometimes they give us their viruses.

One contributing factor to the looming threat of H5N1 is that it has spread among poultry flocks. Quantity of hosts correlates with the quantity of opportunities, and there are, by one authoritative estimate, about 34 billion chickens alive on Earth at a given moment. Most of those are in big commercial operations. What makes such scales dangerous is not the inhumanity involved (thats a separate issue) but the abundance and concentration of animals. Evolution is a numbers game like roulette, though with higher stakes, and for a virus, even in a single host, the numbers are often huge.

One particle of a flu virus replicating in an animal might produce 100 billion more flu particles in a few days. Those offspring will contain many random mutations, which are raw material for evolution. The more spins of that roulette wheel, the greater cumulative chance that the pearly ball will land on a number that breaks the bank.

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Opinion | Factory Farming and Bird Flu Are a Troublesome Mix - The New York Times

Social media users are over-egging claims about the impacts of bird flu outbreaks in Australia and overseas, experts say.

Six Victorian poultry farms have detected cases of avian influenza, sparking fears of egg shortages and mass bird cullings.

The spread of the virus globally has fuelled online conspiracy theories and misinformation about the risks to food supplies and COVID-style lockdowns.

AAP FactCheck has found dozens of outlandish claims on Facebook, TikTok and X about bird flu being deliberately injected into animals to destroy food supplies.

Other social media users predict the World Health Organisation will somehow use the outbreak as a pretext to declare martial law or cancel national elections.

Scientists and industry experts have rubbished those claims, saying the risk to human health in Australia remains low and egg shortages are unlikely.

They explain that the more dangerous strain of bird flu (H5N1) spreading in North America and Europe is not the same as the two (H7N3 and H7N9) detected in Victoria.

Australian Chicken Growers Council chief executive Dr Joanna Sillince says the response to the local outbreak has been "textbook", with governments and industry working "in perfect harmony".

Dr Sillince hosed down claims about potential food shortages.

"There is no egg shortage in Victoria," she told AAP.

"Poultry meat and eggs are perfectly safe to eat."

Professor Marcel Klaassen, a disease ecologist from Deakin University, says the threat to humans is low because of their genetic differences with birds.

"Our common ancestor between birds and mammals goes back a long, long time, so it's not easy for a virus that is specialised for birds to affect humans, or to affect mammals," he told AAP.

Prof Klaassen says the H5N1 strain is "very nasty" but Australia is well-positioned to handle any outbreak due to geographic isolation and low migratory bird traffic.

He says wild birds do bring in new strains from overseas but much more incrementally than in the Northern Hemisphere.

"They trickle in, compared to the considerable amount of traffic you have between other continents.

"So it's just trickling into Australia. But it's not said that we are entirely protected from the nasty virus that is now circulating around the globe."

The spread of H5N1 overseas has caused more concern because it has been detected in mammals including seals, sea lions and cattle.

The federal agriculture department website stays nine outbreaks have occurred in Australia since 1976, all of which were eradicated.

Federal Agriculture Minister Murray Watt emphasised earlier this week that the local outbreak isn't H5N1.

"That's the way we intend to keep it," he said.

The WHO, which has been the subject of much misinformation about bird flu, last recorded a new human case in the Western Pacific Region, including Australia, on March 26.

It certainly hasn't indicated that countries may need to consider the drastic public health measures social media users are discussing.

"Based on available information, WHO assesses the current risk to the general population posed by this virus as low," the WHO's most recent assessment says.

Excerpt from:

Bird flu misinformation spreading faster than virus - Yahoo News Australia

In raw milk samples spiked with high amounts of bird flu virus, small amounts of infectious virus were still detectable after treatment with a standard pasteurization method, researchers said on Friday.

The findings reflect experimental conditions in a laboratory and should not be used to draw any conclusions about the safety of the US milk supply, according to the authors of the study from the US government's National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases (NIAID) Rocky Mountain Laboratories.

The research was published in the New England Journal of Medicine.

Compared to the spiked raw milk with virus floating freely used in the study, raw milk from cows infected with H5N1 influenza may have a different composition or contain virus inside of cells, which may impact heat effects, the researchers said.

US dairy cows were found to be infected with bird flu in March. The US Food and Drug Administration surveyed pasteurized retail samples of milk and estimated that a fifth of the US milk supply contained strands of virus. The agency has said that pasteurized milk is safe to drink.

The virus used in the experiments had been isolated from the lungs of a dead mountain lion, mixed with raw, unpasteurized cow milk samples, and heat-treated at 63 degrees C (145.4 degrees F)and 72 degrees C (161.6 degrees F) for different periods of time.

After treatment at 72 degrees C for 20 seconds five seconds longer than the industry standard for pasteurization at that temperature - very small amounts of infectious virus were detected in one of three samples, the study found.

"This finding indicates the potential for a relatively small but detectable quantity of H5N1 virus to remain infectious in milk after 15 seconds at 72 degrees C if the initial virus levels were sufficiently high, the authors note.

Within 2.5 minutes, treatment at 63 degrees C caused a marked decrease in infectious H5N1 virus levels, indicating that standard industry pasteurization of 30 minutes at that temperature would eliminate infectious virus, the researchers said.

The researchers said that their experimental conditions are not identical to large-scale industrial pasteurization processes for raw milk and that their findings need to be replicated with direct measurement of infected milk in commercial pasteurization equipment.

It remains unknown whether ingesting active H5N1 virus in milk could cause illness in people, the researchers added.

Link:

Pasteurization may not clear bird flu virus from heavily infected milk - The Jerusalem Post

Stanford University infectious disease doctor Abraar Karan has seen a lot of patients with runny noses, fevers, and irritated eyes lately. Such symptoms could signal allergies, Covid, or a cold. This year, theres another suspect, bird flu but theres no way for most doctors to know.

If the government doesnt prepare to ramp up H5N1 bird flu testing, he and other researchers warn, the United States could be caught off guard again by a pandemic.

Were making the same mistakes today that we made with Covid, Deborah Birx, who served as former President Donald Trumps coronavirus response coordinator, said June 4 on CNN.

To become a pandemic, the H5N1 bird flu virus would need to spread from person to person. The best way to keep tabs on that possibility is by testing people.

Scientifically speaking, many diagnostic laboratories could detect the virus. However, red tape, billing issues, and minimal investment are barriers to quickly ramping up widespread availability of testing. At the moment, the Food and Drug Administration has authorized only the Centers for Disease Control and Preventions bird flu test, which is used only for people who work closely with livestock.

State and federal authorities have detected bird flu in dairy cattle in 12 states. Three people who work on separate dairy farms tested positive, and it is presumed they caught the virus from cows. Yet researchers agree that number is an undercount given the CDC has tested only about 40 people for the disease.

Its important to know if this is contained on farms, but we have no information because we arent looking, said Helen Chu, an infectious disease specialist at the University of Washington in Seattle who alerted the country to Covids spread in 2020 by testing people more broadly.

Reports of untested sick farmworkers as well as a maternity worker who had flu symptoms in the areas with H5N1 outbreaks among cattle in Texas suggest the numbers are higher. And the mild symptoms of those who tested positive a cough and eye inflammation, without a fever are such that infected people might not bother seeking medical care and, therefore, wouldnt be tested.

The CDC has asked farmworkers with flu symptoms to get tested, but researchers are concerned about a lack of outreach and incentives to encourage testing among people with limited job security and access to health care. Further, by testing only on dairy farms, the agency likely would miss evidence of wider spread.

Its hard to not compare this to Covid, where early on we only tested people who had traveled, said Benjamin Pinsky, medical director of the clinical virology laboratory at Stanford University. That left us open to not immediately recognizing that it was transmitting among the community.

In the early months of Covid, the rollout of testing in the United States was catastrophically slow. Although the World Health Organization had validated a test and other groups had developed their own using basic molecular biology techniques, the CDC at first insisted on creating and relying on its own test. Adding to delays, the first version it shipped to state health labs didnt work.

The FDA lagged, too. It didnt authorize tests from diagnostic laboratories outside of the CDC until late February 2020.

On Feb. 27, 2020, Chus research lab detected Covid in a teenager who didnt meet the CDCs narrow testing criteria. This case sounded an alarm that Covid had spread below the radar. Scaling up to meet demand took time: Months passed before anyone who needed a Covid test could get one.

Chu notes this isnt 2020 not by a long shot. Hospitals arent overflowing with bird flu patients. Also, the country has the tools to do much better this time around, she said, if theres political will.

For starters, tests that detect the broad category of influenzas that H5N1 belongs to, called influenza A, are FDA-approved and ubiquitous. These are routinely run in the flu season, from November to February. An unusual number of positives from these garden-variety flu tests this spring and summer could alert researchers that something is awry.

Doctors, however, are unlikely to request influenza A tests for patients with respiratory symptoms outside of flu season, in part because health insurers may not cover them except in limited circumstances, said Alex Greninger, assistant director of the clinical virology laboratory at the University of Washington.

Thats a solvable problem, he added. At the peak of the Covid pandemic, the government overcame billing issues by mandating that insurance companies cover tests, and set a lucrative price to make it worthwhile for manufacturers. You ran into a testing booth on every other block in Manhattan because companies got $100 every time they stuck a swab in someones nose, Greninger said.

Another obstacle is that the FDA has yet to allow companies to run their influenza A tests using eye swabs, although the CDC and public health labs are permitted to do so. Notably, the bird flu virus was detected only in an eye swab from one farmworker infected this year and not in samples drawn from the nose or throat.

Overcoming such barriers is essential, Chu said, to ramp up influenza A testing in regions with livestock. The biggest bang for the buck is making sure that these tests are routine at clinics that serve farmworker communities, she said, and suggested pop-up testing at state fairs, too.

In the meantime, novel tests that detect the H5N1 virus, specifically, could be brought up to speed. The CDCs current test isnt very sensitive or simple to use, researchers said.

Stanford, the University of Washington, the Mayo Clinic, and other diagnostic laboratories that serve hospital systems have developed alternatives to detecting the virus circulating now. However, their reach is limited, and researchers stress a need to jump-start additional capacity for testing before a crisis is underway.

How can we make sure that if this becomes a public health emergency we arent stuck in the early days of Covid, where things couldnt move quickly? Pinsky said.

A recent rule that gives the FDA more oversight of lab-developed tests may bog down authorization. In a statement to KFF Health News, the FDA said that, for now, it may allow tests to proceed without a full approval process. The CDC did not respond to requests for comment.

But the American Clinical Laboratory Association has asked the FDA and the CDC for clarity on the new rule. Its slowing things down because its adding to the confusion about what is allowable, said Susan Van Meter, president of the diagnostic laboratory trade group.

Labcorp, Quest Diagnostics, and other major testing companies are in the best position to manage a surge in testing demand because they can process hundreds per day, rather than dozens. But that would require adapting testing processes for their specialized equipment, a process that consumes time and money, said Matthew Binnicker, director of clinical virology at the Mayo Clinic.

Theres only been a handful of H5N1 cases in humans the last few years, he said, so its hard for them to invest millions when we dont know the future.

The government could provide funding to underwrite its research, or commit to buying tests in bulk, much as Operation Warp Speed did to advance Covid vaccine development.

If we need to move to scale this, there would need to be an infusion of money, said Kelly Wroblewski, director of infectious disease programs at the Association of Public Health Laboratories. Like an insurance policy, the upfront expense would be slight compared with the economic blow of another pandemic.

Other means of tracking the H5N1 virus are critical, too. Detecting antibodies against the bird flu in farmworkers would help reveal whether more people have been infected and recovered. And analyzing wastewater for the virus could indicate an uptick in infections in people, birds, or cattle.

As with all pandemic preparedness efforts, the difficulty lies in stressing the need to act before a crisis strikes, Greninger said.

We should absolutely get prepared, he said, but until the government insures some of the risk here, its hard to make a move in that direction.

KFF Health News is a national newsroom that produces in-depth journalism about health issues and is one of the core operating programs at KFF the independent source for health policy research, polling, and journalism.

Amy Maxmen | KFF Health News

Amy Maxmen | KFF Health News

Arthur Allen | KFF Health News

Arthur Allen | KFF Health News

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Bird flu tests are hard to get. How will we know when to sound the alarm? - NBC News